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PENNSYLVANIA V. UNION GAS: CONGRESSIONAL
ABROGATION OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, OR,
LIVING WITH HANS
INTRODUCTION
The eleventh amendment' constricted the state-citizen diversity clause
of article II2 by providing that citizens of one state could not sue an-
other state in federal court. Its words appear innocent when compared
with the amount of academic3 and judicial4 controversy they have gener-
ated. A purely textual analysis would hardly reveal the areas into which
the amendment has intruded.5
The Supreme Court's consistently expansive reading of the amend-
ment has been justified by a concern for state sovereign immunity, an
ostensibly constitutional principle for which the amendment stands.6 In
1. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const.
amend. XI.
2. "The judicial power shall extend to all Cases... between a State and Citizens of
another State ... ." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
3. See, e.g., J. Orth, The Judicial Power of the United States-The Eleventh Amend-
ment in American History (1987); C. Jacobs, The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign
Immunity (1972); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doc-
trines: Congressional Imposition of Suit upon the States, 126 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1203 (1978)
[hereinafter Field I1]; Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity
Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. Penn. L. Rev. 515 (1977) [hereinafter Field l]; Fletcher, A
Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Af-
firmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 Stan. L.
Rev. 1033 (1983); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889 (1983); Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Elev-
enth Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale L.J. 1 (1988); L. Marshall,
Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1342 (1989); Shapiro,
Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 61
(1984); Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation:
Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 682
(1976). But see W. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Criti-
cal Evaluation, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1372 (1989).
4. A majority of the Court currently adheres to a constitutional principle of state
sovereign immunity. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 235-47
(1985). Justice Brennan, however, strongly disagrees. He set forth his lengthy argument
for the diversity theory in the same case. See id. at 247-302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5. For example, the Court has interpreted the amendment to restrict the federal
judicial power in admiralty suits, despite the amendment's express terms ("any suit in law
or equity"). See Exparte New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (overruling United
States v. Bright, 24 F. Cas. 1232 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809) (No. 14,647)). See generally Fletcher,
supra note 3, at 1079-83 (arguing that in omitting admiralty from text of eleventh amend-
ment, adopters probably at least foresaw application of federal law in private admiralty
suits against states).
6. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984)
(referring to "the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity"); New York, 256 U.S. at
497 (idea that private plaintiff cannot sue a state without its consent is "the fundamental
rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification"). But see J. Orth, supra note 3,
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the most expansive application of the eleventh amendment, the Court
embraced a constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity and held
that the amendment precluded private plaintiffs from suing states in fed-
eral question cases.7
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas,8 commentators thought that the Court would use the case to put its
eleventh amendment jurisprudence in order.9 The decision was supposed
to address the issues of whether Congress had abrogated the states' im-
munity with the requisite clear language in the text of the statutes in
question and whether Congress had the power to do so under the com-
merce clause. 10
Despite expectations, the Union Gas Court addressed the main issue
(whether Congress has power under the commerce clause to abrogate the
states' sovereign immunity) without definitively answering it" and in-
jected uncertainty into the supposedly settled requirement of a clear
statement of abrogation by Congress."z
-Part I of this Comment reviews the adoption of and theories about the
eleventh amendment, as well as its common law history. Part II sets
forth the lower court opinions and summarizes how the Supreme Court
voted. Part III discusses and analyzes the opinions of the Court in an
attempt to understand the impact of Union Gas. This Comment con-
cludes that because of the composition of the two majorities, Union Gas
at 12-29 (discussing British and early colonial understanding of sovereign immunity and
understanding expressed at ratifying conventions); Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1895-914
(same).
7. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); infra notes 17, 25-32 and accompanying
text.
8. 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988).
9. See, eg., Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56
U. Chi. L. Rev. 61, 147-50 (1989) (discussing possible outcomes of Union Gas); Shreve,
Letting Go of the Eleventh Amendment, 64 Ind. L.J. 601, 601-02, 615 (1989) (suggesting
that the Union Gas Court look for provisions other that the eleventh amendment on
which to base state immunity).
10. The two issues are almost invariably addressed in this logically backward order.
This method has the advantage of avoiding constitutional interpretation unless it is abso-
lutely necessary (that is, unless Congress has made a sufficiently clear statement of its
intent to abrogate). But see In re McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d 311, 314-27 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 895 (1987) (addressing issue of source of power to abrogate before issue
of clear statement).
The Court had left open the commerce clause issue in two recent cases. See Welch v.
Texas Dep't of Highways & Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 475 (1987); County of Oneida v.
Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 250-53 (1985).
11. Compare Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,- 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2281-86 (1989) (opin-
ion of Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J.) with id. at 2295
(opinion of White, J., concurring in judgment with respect to the article I issue).
12. See id. at 2277-80 (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., Blackmun, J.,
Stevens, J., and Scalia, J.); id. at 2295-96 (Scalia, J., concurring with respect to statutory
interpretation issue). But see Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2400-02 (1989) (handed
down same day as Union Gas, reaffirming clear statement rule for congressional
abrogation).
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lends itself to widely divergent interpretations and may further confuse
eleventh amendment jurisprudence.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History and Theory
Born in the financial aftermath of the Revolutionary War,13 the elev-
enth amendment was a direct response to the Supreme Court's decision
in Chisholm v. Georgia." In Chisholm, the Court upheld the attempt of
an estate executor from South Carolina acting on behalf of the decedent,
a South Carolina citizen, to recover in assumpsit money owed by the
state of Georgia for military goods. 5 The eleventh amendment was
passed approximately three years after the final judgment in Chisholm.16
Despite its plain language, the amendment has engendered two radi-
cally different schools of thought regarding its meaning and effect. First,
the sovereign immunity or "profound shock"' 7 theory posits that article
13. In the 1783 peace treaty, Great Britain and the newly-formed United States
agreed that both American and British creditors would be able to recover the full value of
all current debts in sterling. See Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1900. Judge Gibbons argues
that concerns about enforcing the treaty were prevalent, especially with regard to the
southern states who owed approximately $28 million to the British. Those states were
incensed because the British army had taken thousands of slaves when it evacuated after
the Revolutionary War, in violation of the treaty. In response, the southern states en-
acted barriers to collecting debts and refused to enforce other treaty provisions. Con-
cerns with noncompliance thus informed much of the debate surrounding the ratification
of article III. See id. at 1899-901.
14. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Each Justice, as was the early custom, delivered an
opinion. Justice Iredell wrote the only dissent. See id. at 429.
15. See id. at 466 (opinion of Wilson, J.). Judge Gibbons noted, as background for
Chisholm, that "the American government was relying on the availability of relief in the
federal courts for treaty violations as a bargaining position with the British government."
Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1920. Thus, the framers probably envisioned a somewhat gen-
erous reading of Article III. Cf The Federalist No. 80 (A. Hamilton) (discussing need
for alienage jurisdiction to further foreign relations).
16. See J. Orth, supra note 3, at 19-20; C. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 65-67.
17. The phrase originated in the Hans Court's discussion of the adoption of the elev-
enth amendment, in which the Court stated that the decision in Chisholm sent a "shock
of surprise throughout the country." Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1889). The
evidence relied on by advocates of the profound shock theory is basically two-fold. First,
the states adopted the amendment so quickly. This is cited as demonstrative of the in-
tense negative reaction to Chisholm. Professor Orth, however, notes that "[s]peedy adop-
tion is not significant . . .; State legislatures were less busy in the early days of the
Republic and few items on their agenda were more important than state debts." J. Orth,
supra note 3, at 27.
Second, seemingly dispositive are statements by James Madison, John Marshall and
Alexander Hamilton on the state-citizen clause of article III. At the Virginia ratifying
convention, Madison stated
"Its jurisdiction [the federal jurisdiction] in controversies between a State and
citizens of another State is much objected to, and perhaps without reason. It is
not in the power of individuals to call any State into court. The only operation
it can have is that, if a State should wish to bring a suit against a citizen, it must
be brought before the federal court."
Hans, 134 U.S. at 14 (quoting 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
1989]
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III was never intended to allow for a private suit against a state. The
amendment was the natural reaction to the Chisholm Court's attempt to
read article III in this way. Under the sovereign immunity theory, the
amendment bars all private suits against a state in federal court, regard-
less of jurisdictional basis or citizenship of the private plaintiff. The un-
derlying meaning of article III's grant of congressional power informs
the amendment's explicit limitation on the federal judicial power.
A second school of thought interprets the amendment narrowly, argu-
ing that it restricts federal judicial power only where diversity is the sole
jurisdictional basis for a suit against a state. 8 Thus, any federal question
Adoption of the Federal Constitution 533 (J. Elliot ed. 1836)). At the same convention,
Marshall stated
With respect to disputes between a State and the citizens of another State, its
jurisdiction has been decried with unusual vehemence. I hope that no gen-
tleman will think that a State will be called at the bar of the federal court.... It
is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before a
court. The intent is to enable States to recover claims of individuals residing in
other States.
Id. at 14 (quoting The Debates, supra, at 555-56).
Finally, in The Federalist No. 81, Hamilton wrote
"It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice
of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now
enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there
is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with
the States, and the danger intimated must be merely ideal."
Id. at 13 (emphasis in original) (quoting The Federalist No. 81 (A. Hamilton) (1st ed.
1788)). The Hans Court cited these statements as indicative of a pre-Chisholm under-
standing that article III did not by itself do away with state sovereign immunity and that
the state-citizen diversity clause could not operate to allow a private suit against an un-
willing state in federal court. The Court also relied on the statements by Madison, Mar-
shall and Hamilton for the proposition that state sovereign immunity was embodied in
the Constitution. See id. at 12-14.
Commentators have recently clarified the meaning of these statements. Professor Field
argues that these statements were made simply to placate anti-federalist opponents of
ratification who believed that article III itself abrogated sovereign immunity. See Field I,
supra note 3, at 527-36. Judge Gibbons claims that Madison's statement, made at the
Virginia ratifying convention with an awareness of Virginia's peace treaty violations,
meant that an unconsenting state could not be sued in federal court on a state law claim.
See Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1905-06. In the alternative, it is possible that Madison was
"merely dissembling." Id. at 1906. Marshall's statement was a "misreading" of article
III that he later corrected in his opinions as Chief Justice. Id. at 1907 & n.85. Concern-
ing the excerpt from The Federalist No. 81, Judge Gibbons explains that
Hamilton uses this passage to address fears that states could be compelled to
repay [war] notes in gold and silver ....
... [Tihe passage may be read as arguing not so much that the federal courts
would not have jurisdiction over suits as that there would not be any right of
action for plaintiffs to sue on.
Id. at 1911. Judge Gibbons also points to evidence from the New York and North Caro-
lina ratifying conventions that the delegates did not understand sovereign immunity to be
inherent in article III. See id. at 1912-13.
18. Typical reasons supporting the "diversity-only" theory include: the language of
the amendment closely parallels the jurisdictional grant in article III, section 2; the lan-
guage of the amendment does not mention federal question cases; Federalists and anti-
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case, even one brought by a private in-state plaintiff, may be heard in
federal court.1 9 Simply stated, sovereign immunity survived the enact-
ment of article III as a state common-law doctrine, allowing states to
raise a defense of sovereign immunity in state law actions brought in
federal court under the state-citizen diversity clause. In federally-created
causes of action, however, article III's federal question grant of jurisdic-
tion was intended to be coextensive with the legislative authority.20 Thus
Congress enacted the eleventh amendment to correct the Chisholm
Court's overly broad interpretation of article III's state-citizen diversity
clause.2 Under this view, the amendment is only jurisdictional in na-
ture, serving to bar private suits against unconsenting states for which
the only jurisdictional basis is either the state-citizen or state-alien diver-
sity clause. Decisions that expand the amendment based on an underly-
ing constitutional principle of sovereign immunity are mistaken.22
Justice Brennan has enunciated a watered-down version of the diver-
sity-only theory.23 The "surrender" theory posits that in ratifying the
Constitution, the states necessarily surrendered their right to be free from
regulation by Congress pursuant to its enumerated powers. At the same
time, the states consented to whatever means (including suit in federal
Federalists supported the amendment; and the case overturned by the amendment was
brought under the state-citizen jurisdictional grant of article III. See Jackson, supra note
3, at 44-48. In addition, at the time of the amendment, Congress had not yet conferred
federal question jurisdiction; it did not do so until 1875. See, e.g., Field I, supra note 3, at
540 n.88.
19. A variation on the "diversity-only" theme contends that the language of the
amendment limits judicial not congressional power and, therefore, Congress can abrogate
states' immunity when legislating under its plenary powers. See Tribe, supra note 3, at
694. Professor Tribe, a proponent of this view, argues that precluding private suits
against states can undermine Congress' article I legislative goals and that Congress, the
branch closest to the people, will be most attentive to state concerns when considering
abrogation. See id. at 694-95.
20. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 276-78 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Jackson, supra note 3, at 125. But see Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984) ("the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity
limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III"; that is, article III is incapable of an
interpretation which extends the federal judicial power to private suits against unconsent-
ing states).
21. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 281-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Gibbons,
supra note 3, at 2004 ("[T]he amendment ... was the product of a clever maneuver by the
Federalists to deflect republican opposition to Chisholm, while preserving the power of
federal courts to hear claims arising under the 1783 peace treaty .... ).
22. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 259-60, 289 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23. In Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), Justice Brennan distinguished
the commerce clause, pursuant to which the states surrendered their immunity, from the
contract clause, which is merely a self-imposed restriction on the states. See id. at 186-87,
190-91.
Professor Field has advanced a similar view. She would distinguish between different
types of federal question cases by asking if the constitutional provision on which the
federal question is based abrogates common-law immunity "of its own force." Field II,
supra note 3, at 1268. Under her interpretation, Hans would survive because the ratifica-
tion of the contract clause itself did not do away with sovereign immunity. See id. at
1266-67.
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court) Congress chose to enforce such regulation.2 4 The subtle substan-
tive distinction between the diversity-only and surrender theories lies in
their respective scopes. The latter views constitutional grants of enumer-
ated powers as eliminating whatever sovereign immunity existed before
ratification; the former does not distinguish between enumerated powers
and other provisions.
B. A Difficult Precedent and its Progeny
1. Hans v. Louisiana
Like its adoption, the first major interpretation of the eleventh amend-
ment was also precipitated by economic realities, specifically, the south-
ern states' repudiation of bonds they had issued to finance the Civil
War.2
5
In 1879, Louisiana stopped levying taxes to pay the interest on its
bonds and reduced the interest rate on those bonds.26 In 1890, Hans, a
Louisiana citizen, sued his state to recover on such bonds.2 7 Hans ar-
gued that the issuance of the bonds created contracts between the state
and the bondholders and that the state constitutional provision repudiat-
ing the bonds violated the contract clause by impairing those contracts.28
Hans is the Supreme Court's most forceful explication of sovereign
immunity theory.2 9 Bereft of textual support, the Court relied on the
dissent of Justice Iredell in Chisholm and found that the amendment rep-
resented the "will of the ultimate sovereignty of the whole country."30
The idea that a state could be subject to suit by an individual in federal
court went against "the established order of things," and was "a con-
struction [of the Constitution] never imagined or dreamed of, .... a thing
unknown to the law.., so often laid down and acknowledged by courts
and jurists that it is hardly necessary to be formally asserted," and
"anomalous and unheard of when the Constitution was adopted."'" The
Hans Court held that the eleventh amendment restricted the federal judi-
24. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 191-92; see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 457-
58 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v.
Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 300-01 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
25. The Supreme Court heard bond cases from 1875 until 1934. See Gibbons, supra
note 3, at 1977-98, 2003. "[A]t the dawn of the post-Reconstruction era the Supreme
Court faced a draconian choice between repudiation of some of its most inviolable consti-
tutional doctrines [i.e., the contract clause] and the humiliation of seeing its political
authority compromised as its judgments met the resistance of hostile state governments."
Id. at 1974.
26. See J. Orth, supra note 3, at 66; Gibbons, supra note 3, at 2000.
27. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
28. See id. at 2-3.
29. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussion of sovereign immunity
theory).
30. Hans, 134 U.S. at 11. This can be said, however, about every constitutional
amendment.
31. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 14, 15, 16, 18 (1890).
[Vol. 58
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cial power in all federal question cases.3 2 In doing so, the Court broadly
precluded the possibility of a citizen suing his own state in federal court.
2. Subverting Hans
In 1908, the Court partially repudiated Hans in form if not in sub-
stance. In Ex parte Young,"3 it held that the eleventh amendment did not
protect a state officer who had acted pursuant to an unconstitutional stat-
ute. 4 That decision established the fiction that a state cannot authorize
an unconstitutional act, and therefore, the offending state officer must
necessarily have acted outside his authority. 5
The repudiation of Hans began anew with the Warren Court. The
issues of congressional abrogation of state immunity and state consent to
suit came into focus as the key questions over which the theoretical battle
would continue.
In Parden v. Terminal Railway, 6 an employee of a state-owned and
operated railroad sued the state in federal court to recover for personal
injuries under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"). 37 The
state pleaded sovereign immunity.38 The Court considered whether Con-
gress intended to subject states to federal court suit when it enacted
FELA and whether it had the power to do so.3 9 The Court answered the
32. Id. at 10-11.
33. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
34. Id. at 159-60.
35. The Court explained:
[If the act to be enforced is unconstitutional], the use of the name of the State to
enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding
without the authority of and one which does not affect the State in its sovereign
or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state
official in attempting by the use of the name of the State to enforce a legislative
enactment which is void because unconstitutional.
Id. at 159. Professor Orth, among others, has noted the irony of this fiction. Liability
under the fourteenth amendment normally requires state action, but in Ex parte Young
the state officer was essentially stripped of his official status for eleventh amendment pur-
poses and was still held liable for acting pursuant to an unconstitutional law. See J. Orth,
supra note 3, at 130.
The Court later expanded the eleventh amendment's coverage even further, holding
that the eleventh amendment bars suit by a foreign state against a state. See Principality
of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934). Chief Justice Hughes' opinion for
the Court contains the following famous language: "Manifestly, we cannot rest with a
mere literal application of the words of § 2 of Article III, or assume that the letter of the
Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States.
Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control."
Id. at 322. The Court thus grounded sovereign immunity not in the eleventh amendment
but in the Constitution as a whole.
36. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
37. Id. at 185-86. FELA provides that "[e]very common carrier by railroad while
engaging in commerce between any of the several States... shall be liable in damages to
any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce," 45
U.S.C. § 51 (1982), and that such an employee can sue in federal court. Id. § 56.
38. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 186 (1964).
39. See id. at 187.
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first question affirmatively, reasoning that Congress "meant what it said"
when it made FELA applicable to "'every' common carrier."' ' The
Court stated that "we should not presume to say, in the absence of ex-
press provision to the contrary, that [Congress] intended to exclude a
particular group of... workers [i.e., those employed by state-owned rail-
roads] from the benefits conferred by the Act."'" One of those benefits
was the right to sue in federal court.42
The Court also answered the congressional power question affirma-
tively and relied on the surrender theory.43 When the states ratified the
commerce clause, they necessarily surrendered their sovereignty in that
area; Congress could thus subject the states to suit in federal court when
it enacted FELA.4 The Court further reasoned that the state, by operat-
ing a railroad in interstate commerce, had consented to being sued under
FELA in federal court.45 The Court relied on the fact that the state had
notice of FELA when it began operating the railroad and that precluding
private suits "would remove an important weapon from the congres-
sional arsenal with respect to a substantial volume of regulable
conduct.,
46
Justice White, in dissent, argued that Congress could condition state
participation in interstate commerce on amenability to suit in federal
court only if that condition was unmistakably clear.47 He maintained
that the states' immunity from suit in federal court derives from the Con-
stitution and therefore deserves greater protection.48
3. Hans Redux
Nine years later, the Parden dissenters advanced their position in Em-
ployees of the Department of Public Health and Welfare v. Department of
Public Health and Welfare,49 where state employees sought overtime pay
and liquidated damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA").5 ° The Court held that the states' constitutional immunity
40. Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 190.
42. The presumption used by the Parden Court is not embraced by the current Court.
See Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2402 (1989) (although states are "logical defend-
ants" under the Education of the Handicapped Act, lack of unequivocal textual evidence
of congressional abrogation will defeat plaintiff's damages action).
43. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 190-92 (1964); supra notes 23-24 and
accompanying text (discussion of surrender theory).
44. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 190-92.
45. See id. at 192.
46. Id. at 198.
47. See id. at 199.
48. See id.
49. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982). Section 16(b) of the FLSA made any employer liable
for wages, overtime compensation and liquidated damages, and subject to suit in "any...
court of competent jurisdiction." Id. The definition of "employer" in section 3(d) at first
expressly excluded the United States and the individual states, but was amended in 1966
to include employees of state hospitals and related institutions.
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was not affected by the amended Act's extension of coverage because no
clear evidence of congressional intent to lift state immunity existed.-"
Therefore, the Court did not reach the issue of whether Congress had the
power to abrogate. The Court weakly distinguished Parden, reasoning
that the operation of a railroad by Alabama was a proprietary activity 2
while Missouri's operation of a welfare department was governmental, a
distinction that is now questionable.5 3
Justice Brennan dissented and found Parden's surrender theory con-
trolling. 4 He disputed the Court's theory that article III and the elev-
enth amendment embody a constitutional principle of state sovereign
immunity.5 5 Justice Brennan asserted that such immunity was merely an
"ancient nonconstitutional" common-law doctrine.5 6 He also elaborated
on the surrender theory by distinguishing Hans, a case based on the con-
tract clause, from Employees, which involved the commerce clause.
There was no surrender of immunity in the contract clause because that
clause is simply a "self-imposed prohibitionl" on the states; by contrast,
the commerce clause is an enumerated congressional power "whose effec-
tive enforcement required surrender of immunity."5 7
In Edelman v. Jordan,5" the Court qualified the Ex parte Young excep-
tion for private suits against state officers. It held that the eleventh
51. See Employees, 411 U.S. at 285.
In Justice Marshall's often-quoted concurring opinion, he stated: "The root of the
constitutional impediment to the exercise of the federal judicial power ... is not the
Eleventh Amendment but Art. III of our Constitution." Id. at 291 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring). According to the historical evidence, Article III was intended to mean that the
states cannot be subject to private suit without their consent. Thus, state consent to
federal court suit is the true issue. See id. at 294-95. Justice Marshall reasoned that in
Parden the state began operating the railroad well after FELA had been enacted. See id.
at 296. Thus, Alabama had "at least legal notice" that operating an interstate railroad
was conditioned on amenability to federal court suit. By contrast, Missouri had no "true
choice" because it either had to consent to suit or cease running the relevant vital agen-
cies. See id. Justice Marshall has since defected from the sovereign immunity camp. See
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247-302 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (joined by Justice Marshall).
52. See Employees, 411 U.S. at 284.
53. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537-47 (1985)
(overruling category of "traditional governmental functions" as defining scope of state
regulatory immunity).
54. See Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 298-99 (1973).
55. See id. at 309-10.
56. See id. at 314 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57. See id. at 320 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This is, perhaps, a distinction without
a difference. Both an express grant of power to Congress and a self-imposed restriction
are irreversible absent a constitutional amendment. Furthermore, the textual basis for
private enforcement in federal court of a self-imposed restriction, like the contract clause,
is even more compelling. This is because the people placed such a restriction on the
states; with an express grant of power, the people have just given Congress the right to
impose restrictions on the states. Therefore, it may be incorrect to call such a restriction
self-imposed in that it is not the states which are imposing the restrictions.
58. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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amendment prohibits retrospective monetary relief absent state consent
to federal court suit, even in an Ex parte Young action, because such
relief would be paid out of the public fisc.59 The award of prospective
(injunctive) relief' was upheld.6" The Court refused to find that the
state consented to federal court suit merely by participating in a federal
funding program. The Court noted that "we will find waiver only where
stated 'by the most express language or by such overwhelming implica-
tions from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable con-
struction,'" thereby upping the abrogation ante.62 Justice Brennan, in
dissent, reiterated his surrender theory.63
In its 1976 decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 4 the Court squarely ad-
dressed the congressional power issue and held that Congress can abro-
gate state sovereign immunity when it legislates pursuant to section five
of the fourteenth amendment. 65 The Court reasoned that "the Eleventh
Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies,
•.. are necessarily limited by... § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 66
It is difficult to tell whether the Court was tacitly distinguishing the four-
teenth amendment from other congressional powers, such as those enu-
merated in article 1.67 Certainly Justice Brennan, concurring in the
judgment, did not agree with this distinction. He stated that the employ-
ment discrimination statutes at issue were enacted under the fourteenth
amendment and the commerce clause, both of which are enumerated
congressional powers created by surrender of state sovereignty.68
4. The Clear Statement Rule
Finally, since its 1985 decision in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scan-
Ion,6 9 the Court has further refined what has come to be known as the
59. See id. at 677-78.
60. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
61. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664.
62. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distil-
ling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)).
63. "I remain of the opinion that 'because of its surrender [in art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ], no
immunity exists that can be the subject of a congressional declaration or a voluntary
waiver'...." Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The
Congress shall have Power To... provide for the... general Welfare of the United
States ...").
64. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
65. Section five of the fourteenth amendment states that "Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 5.
66. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
67. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2302 (1989) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing that only post-eleventh amendment provi-
sions directed against the states' authority can be read to permit abrogation); Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) (including ability of Congress to abro-
gate under fourteenth amendment in category of "well-established exceptions to the reach
of the Eleventh Amendment").
68. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 457-58 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
69. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
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"clear statement" rule of congressional abrogation. 70 In Atascadero, the
Court held that congressional intent to abrogate the states' immunity
must be "unmistakably clear" in the text of the statute.71 And in
Dellmuth v. Muth,72 decided the same day as Union Gas, the Court made
the test even tougher, holding that congressional intent must be "une-
quivocal."7" The rule derives from basic federalism considerations of the
"constitutional role of the States ' 74 and a consequent desire to avoid
overreaching by the federal judiciary.75
Recently, therefore, the Court has upheld the states' eleventh amend-
ment immunity claims based on the lack of unequivocal evidence that
Congress intended to abrogate in the statute at issue. It has not had to
reach the question of whether Congress actually had power to abrogate
in the first place.
In Atascadero and Muth, the statutes at issue were enacted under the
fourteenth amendment. 76  Thus, Fitzpatrick affirmatively resolved the
power question in those cases. The statutes at issue in other recent elev-
enth amendment cases, however, were enacted under the commerce
clause and the bankruptcy clause.77 The plurality in Welch v. Texas De-
partment of Highways and Public Transportation tersely stated: "We as-
sume, without deciding or intimating a view of the question, that the
authority of Congress to subject unconsenting States to suit in federal
court is not confined to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."7 "
At the time of the Union Gas decision, Atascadero's strong clear state-
ment rule was in effect, and the issue of congressional power to abrogate
under constitutional provisions other than the fourteenth amendment
was open. In addition, whether Hans would propel itself out of article
70. See, ag., Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818,
2822 (1989) (following Atascadero); Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2401 (1989)
("evidence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual"); Welch v.
Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 476-78 (1987) (overruling dis-
cussion of congressional intent in Parden).
71. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
72. 109 S. Ct. 2397 (1989).
73. See id. at 2401.
74. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 477 (1987).
75. See Tribe, supra note 3, at 696 n.73. "The point of [the clear statement rule] is to
make sure that state concerns are given an adequate airing in congressional processes of
decision." Id. The Court's lengthy discussion of protection of state sovereignty in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), calls this notion
into question. See id. at 550-54. There the Court reasoned that the structure of the
federal government was the most important insurer of state interests: "State sovereign
interests ... are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the struc-
ture of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power." Id. at
552.
76. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2400 n.1 (1989); Atascadero State Hosp.
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985).
77. See Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818, 2821
(1989); Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 475 & n.5
(1987).
78. Welch, 483 U.S. at 475 (citation omitted).
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III and become an even more formidable constitutional precedent re-
mained to be seen.
II. UNION GAS-AN OVERVIEW
The federal government and the state of Pennsylvania conducted suc-
cessful clean-up activities at the first Superfund site, where Union Gas
had operated a coal gasification facility. The United States then sued
Union Gas 9 to recover for clean-up expenses under sections 104 and 107
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Lia-
bility Act ("CERCLA").80 Union Gas filed a third-party complaint
against Pennsylvania alleging that the state, which had acquired ease-
ments over the site and thus become an owner-operator, had negligently
caused deposits of coal tar to seep into a creek that the state was excavat-
ing."1 Pennsylvania moved to dismiss the third-party complaint, arguing
that the eleventh amendment precluded jurisdiction over a state in a suit
by a private plaintiff.s2
The district court dismissed the complaint against the state, finding
that Congress' intent to abrogate states' immunity in CERCLA was not
sufficiently clear.83 The court rejected Union Gas' argument that the def-
inition of a "person," who can be liable under the statute for clean-up
costs, includes a state.8 4
After settling with the federal government, Union Gas proceeded to
appeal the district court's dismissal of its action against Pennsylvania.8 5
The Third Circuit noted that Union Gas' argument based on the defini-
tion of "person" was "not without force,"8 6 but nevertheless affirmed the
judgment of dismissal.8 7
79. See United States v. Union Gas Co., 575 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606 (1982). CERCLA provides that the owner or operator
of a facility where a hazardous substance is disposed of is liable for cleanup costs. Id.
§ 9607(a)(1).
81. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2276-77 (1989); United
States v. Union Gas, 575 F. Supp. at 950.
82. See United States v. Union Gas Co., 575 F. Supp. at 950.
83. See United States v. Union Gas Co., 575 F. Supp. 949, 952-53 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
84. See id. at 953; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1982) (definition of "person").
85. See United States v. Union Gas Co., 792 F.2d 372, 375 (3d Cir. 1986).
86. Id. at 379.
87. See id. at 374. The Third Circuit relied primarily on Employees and Atascadero.
The Supreme Court decided the latter case-in which it definitively set forth the clear
statement rule-after the district court's decision, presumably making the task of the
Court of Appeals even easier.
Judge Higginbotham dissented, reasoning that the definitional section was adequate
evidence of intent to abrogate. He chided the majority for its strict statutory
interpretation:
In the future, to comply with the rationale of the majority, in definitional sec-
tions of similar statutes where remedies are provided for damages citizens or
corporations have suffered, Congress must use language similar to the follow-
ing: "The term person includes a state, and we really mean the state, and fur-
thermore the eleventh amendment's prohibition on suits against the states does
not apply."
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Union Gas filed a petition for writ of certiorari. In the interim, how-
ever, Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 ("SARA").88 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, va-
cated the judgment and remanded the case to the Third Circuit for re-
consideration in light of SARA. 9
On remand, the Third Circuit concluded that SARA succeeded in ab-
rogating the states' immunity. 90 The court found congressional intent to
abrogate in the parallel language of the SARA provision abrogating
states' immunity and the CERCLA provision abrogating the federal gov-
ernment's immunity.91
Having found intent to abrogate, the court addressed Congress' power
to abrogate under article 1.92 The court found that the states are pre-
sumptively immune from private suit by virtue of the eleventh amend-
ment, but that the presumption can be overcome "where Congress has
clearly articulated its desire to abrogate [the states' immunity]." 93 In ad-
dition, in order to abrogate, Congress must act under one of its plenary
powers.94
The Supreme Court granted certiorari95 on the issues of "whether
[CERCLA] as amended by [SARA] permits a suit for monetary damages
against a State in federal court and, if so, whether Congress has the au-
thority to create such a cause of action when legislating pursuant to the
Commerce Clause." 96
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, Blackmun and Scalia found that
"CERCLA as amended by SARA clearly evinces an intent to hold States
liable in damages in federal court." 97 Justice White, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy found no unmistakable ex-
Id. at 383 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
88. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
89. Union Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania, 479 U.S. 1025 (1987).
90. United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343, 1345 (3d Cir. 1987).
91. See id. at 1348. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9607(g) (now codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 9620(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987)) ("[The Federal Government] shall be subject to ... this
chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively,
as any nongovernmental entity .... .") with 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (Supp. V 1987)
(definitional paragraph added by SARA) ("[A] State... shall be subject to the provisions
of this Chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and sub-
stantively, as any nongovernmental entity. .. ").
92. See Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d at 1350; see also supra note 10.
93. Union Gas, 832 F.2d at 1354.
94. See United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343, 1354 (3d Cir. 1987). The
court relied heavily on the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in In re McVey Trucking, 812
F.2d 311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 895 (1987) (eleventh amendment limits judi-
cial, not congressional power; key issue is whether grant of congressional power is ple-
nary, not whether power was granted before or after passage of the eleventh amendment).
But see supra note 57.
95. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 485 U.S. 958 (1988).
96. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2276 (1989).
97. Id. at 2280; see id. at 2277-80 (Brennan, J.); infra text accompanying note 106-
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pression of congressional intent to abrogate in either statute.9
On the issue of power to abrogate under the commerce clause, Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, Blackmun and White found that the com-
merce clause grants Congress the power to abrogate states' immunity. 99
Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Ken-
nedy found that Congress lacked the power to abrogate under the com-
merce clause."°° In addition to the opinions of Justices Brennan, White
and Scalia, Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion,"0 ' and Justice
O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion." 2
Thus, all possible combinations of votes on the two issues were repre-
sented: intent to abrogate and commerce clause power to abrogate (Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens and Blackmun), intent to abrogate but
no commerce clause power to abrogate (Justice Scalia), no intent to abro-
gate and commerce clause power to abrogate (Justice White), and no
intent to abrogate and no commerce clause power to abrogate (Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy). The theoretical
bases for and anomalies presented by these views are discussed below.
III. UNION GAS-A CLEAR HOLDING, A SHAKY PRECEDENT
The main opinions in Union Gas clearly delineate the two issues-con-
gressional intent to abrogate and commerce clause authority to abrogate.
The combination of results reached by the Justices is illustrative of the
various theories on state sovereign immunity. Therefore, the focus of
this discussion is on the theory that each opinion represents. Lurking in
the background is the Court's struggle over whether Hans v. Louisiana
should be overruled--or, more accurately, how to avoid overruling Hans
and still fashion a reasonable eleventh amendment jurisprudence.
A. Justice Brennan's Opinion
In keeping with his view that the states have no immunity in areas in
which they surrendered their power to Congress, Justice Brennan paid
lip service to the clear statement rule 0 3 in finding that CERCLA and
SARA, read together, give unmistakable evidence of congressional intent
to abrogate."° His interpretation, however, while perfectly reasonable, is
out of step with established precedent. In fact, the Court reiterated the
clear statement rule of Atascadero in seemingly unavoidable terms on the
98. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2289-95 (White, J., concurring).
99. See id. at 2280-86 (Brennan, J.).
100. See id. at 2301-02 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
101. See id. at 2286-89 (Stevens, J., concurring); infra notes 185-194 and accompany-
ing text.
102. See id. at 2303-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); infra text accompanying note 195-
197.
103. See The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading Cases, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 137, 215
& n.67 (1989).
104. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2276-80 (1989).
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same day that it decided Union Gas. '
Justice Brennan's reasoning turned on the relation of the definitional
provisions in both CERCLA and SARA. In the CERCLA liability pro-
vision,106 a "person" can be liable for cleanup costs and other damages.
In the CERCLA definitional section, 10 7 a "State" is included in the defi-
nition of "person." Given Employees' rejection of inferring abrogation
from a definitional section,108 Justice Brennan went on to show that a
new definitional section, 109 added by SARA, did the-trick.' The new
section exempts from liability states and local governments that acquire
facilities involuntarily, unless they are at least partly at fault for the re-
lease or threatened release of a hazardous substance from the facility.'
It would be unnecessary to exempt the states from liability for involunta-
rily-acquired facilities, the argument goes, if the states were not already
liable under CERCLA. 112
Justice Brennan reinforced his argument by referring to two other sec-
tions of CERCLA. These sections essentially exempted states from lia-
bility which presumably would be unnecessary were the states not
already potentially liable."' Finally, he pointed to the SARA language
that "mirrors" the CERCLA waiver of federal government immunity as
evidence of Congress' intention to override the states' immunity." 4
Although relying exclusively on the language of CERCLA and SARA,
Justice Brennan stretched the unmistakable language test of Atascadero
and Muth into something more closely resembling an unmistakable in-
tent test.'1 5 Footnote two of his opinion most clearly demonstrated Jus-
105. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2401 (1989) (court may not look at legis-
lative history for evidence of congressional intent to abrogate; such evidence "must be
both unequivocal and textual").
106. 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
108. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D).
110. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2277-78 (1989).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (Supp. V 1987). This section is an amendment of the
"owner-operator" liability provision in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
112. [SARA contains] an express acknowledgment of Congress' background un-
derstanding-evidenced first in its inclusion of States as 'persons'-that States
would be liable in any circumstance described in [the CERCLA liability provi-
sion] from which they were not expressly excluded. The "exclusion" furnished
to the States... would be unnecessary unless such a background understanding
were at work.
Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2278.
113. See id. at 2278-79; 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(d)(2), 9659(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
114. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2279 (1989).
115. A footnote battle between Justices Brennan and White highlights this shift. Com-
pare id. at 2278 n.2 (accusing Justice White of ignoring the majority's combined reading
of CERCLA and SARA in finding abrogation); id. at 2280 n.3 (disputing Justice White's
interpretation of SARA provision making state or local governments liable to the same
extent "as any nongovernmental entity"); id. at 2280 n.4 (quibbling with Justice White
over his disclaimed requirement of "magic words" in a statute which purports to abro-
gate) with id. at 2290 n.1 ("reject[ing] ... outright" the majority's combined reading of
CERCLA and SARA); id. at 2292 n.4 (attacking Justice Brennan's interpretation of 42
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tice Brennan's loose application of the Atascadero standard: "[S]urely
judges can disagree about the content and rigor of the standard of 'un-
mistakable clarity,' and if they do, they are likely to reach different re-
sults on States' amenability to suit for reasons having nothing to do with
the statutory language itself.""' 6 If one faithfully followed the strictures
of Atascadero and Muth, as Justice White does,1 17 no such disagreement
would be possible. Thus, Justice Brennan seemed to use only that part of
the unmistakable language test that mandates looking exclusively at the
text of a statute for evidence of congressional intent to abrogate. He then
proceeded to turn the inquiry into one of unmistakable intent, thus mak-
ing it permissible to engage in comparisons between different sections of
a statute and to draw inferences from such comparisons.
In Part III of the opinion, Justice Brennan's surrender theory finally
carried the day."I8 As background, he cited a "trail" of cases "unmistak-
ably leading to the conclusion that Congress may permit suits against the
States for money damages."' 19 He deemed the reasoning of Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer equally applicable to authority under the commerce clause.120
Specifically, Justice Brennan stated that the commerce clause, like the
fourteenth amendment, is a plenary power which "both expands federal
power and contracts state power."' 2'1
Pennsylvania had advanced, as did Justice Scalia, a chronological ar-
gument to distinguish fourteenth amendment abrogation authority from
authority derived from the commerce clause. That is, the fourteenth
amendment altered the principle represented by the eleventh amendment
(that an unconsenting state cannot be sued by a private plaintiff in federal
court), while the eleventh amendment altered Congress' authority under
the commerce clause.122 Justice Brennan refuted this argument by sim-
ply adding a new level-the pre-ratification existence of sovereign immu-
U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2)); id. at 2293 n.5 (disputing Justice Brennan's interpretation of
SARA); id. at 2294 n.6 (questioning Justice Brennan's interpretation of phrase "as any
nongovernmental entity"); id. at 2294 n.7 (comparing amendments to Rehabilitation Act
after Atascadero, which make specific reference to the eleventh amendment, with SARA,
which does not).
116. Id. at 2278 n.2.
117. See infra notes 131-135 and accompanying text.
118. Or did it? See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2295 (1989)
(White, J., concurring) ("I agree with the conclusion.., that Congress has the authority
under Article I to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States, although I
do not agree with much of [Justice Brennan's] reasoning.").
It is interesting to note that while Justice Brennan is specific in finding the commerce
clause as a source of authority to abrogate, Justice White finds that the source of author-
ity can be any clause of article I. See The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading Cases,
supra note 103, at 216 & n.75.
119. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2281 (discussing Parden's surrender theory, Employees'
acceptance of it, and Welch and Oneida Indian Nation's assumption of commerce clause
authority).
120. See id. at 2282.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 2282-83.
[Vol. 58
PENNSYLVANIA V. UNION GAS
nity-to the chronology.123 Thus, the commerce clause worked a change
on the doctrine of sovereign immunity.1 24
Finally, Justice Brennan cited the need for private causes of action to
effectuate Congress' goals in enacting commerce clause legislation, 125 an
idea that bears some resemblance to classic abrogation theory.126
The internal inconsistency in Justice Brennan's opinion arises in its
last paragraph, where he states, "Given our ruling in favor of Union Gas,
we need not reach its argument that [Hans] should be overruled." 2 ' The
trouble lies in the fact that the ruling upholding commerce clause power
to abrogate can be seen as itself overruling Hans. That is, if Hans held
that the eleventh amendment bars private federal question suits against
unconsenting states, the Court has now opened up a very large area of
potential federal question suits, those based on congressionally-created
commerce clause causes of action. Thus, it seems somewhat disingenu-
ous for the Court to deal with the implications of its decision for Hans by
not dealing with Hans at all. 128
A likely explanation for this inconsistency is the pragmatic one,
namely that in order to ensure Justice White's fifth vote on the commerce
clause issue, 29 Justice Brennan had to state specifically that he was leav-
ing Hans alone. Since only four Justices favor overruling Hans,130 Jus-
tice Brennan's explicit bow to Hans was superfluous.
B. Justice White's Opinion
The main difference between Justice White's view on abrogation in
Union Gas and Justice Brennan's view is that Justice White, strictly ap-
plying Atascadero, refused to look at CERCLA and SARA together.1 31
He first rejected CERCLA as containing evidence of congressional intent
123. See id. at 2283.
124. See id. ("[I]t is not the Commerce Clause that came first, but 'the principle em-
bodied in the Eleventh Amendment' that did so.") But see C. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 5-9
(pre-ratification acceptance of complete sovereign immunity is questionable).
125. Justice Brennan explained:
If States, which comprise a significant class of owners and operators of hazard-
ous-waste sites... need not pay for the costs of cleanup, the overall effect on
voluntary cleanups will be substantial. This case thus shows why the space
carved out for federal legislation under the commerce power must include the
power to hold States financially accountable not only to the Federal Govern-
ment, but to private citizens as well.
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2285 (1989); see The Supreme Court,
1988 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 103, at 215-16.
126. See supra note 19.
127. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2286 (1989).
128. See supra note 57.
129. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2295 n.8 (Justice White's conclusion that Hans
should not be overruled).
130. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2403 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, urging overruling Hans).
131. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2290 n.1 (1989) (White, J.,
concurring in judgment).
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to abrogate, relying on Employees' holding that inclusion of states in a
definitional section is not the kind of unmistakable evidence required.' 32
Instead, Justice White concluded that such language means that the fed-
eral government may sue states for violations of the statute. 133
In addition, Justice White relied on the separate waiver of federal gov-
ernment immunity, which he concluded would be redundant if Congress
had waived that immunity by including the United States Government in
the definition of "person." 134 Likewise, he viewed the SARA exemption
from liability for state and local governments that involuntarily acquire
facilities as just limiting the liability of the federal government.'3 5
At the same time, Justice White cryptically found that Congress had
authority to abrogate, not only under the commerce clause, but under all
of article 1.136 Given that his view on the abrogation issue is dispositive,
it is interesting that he chose to address the congressional authority issue
at all. 137
Unfortunately, he raised and dispensed with the issue in one uninform-
ative paragraph in which he also reiterated his view that Hans should not
be overruled.' 38  He relied on "the reasons stated by the plurality in
[Welch]."' 39 The Welch plurality, however, relied primarily on the doc-
trine of stare decisis, bolstered by the ambiguity of the historical evidence
concerning article III's effect on state sovereign immunity."4° In the face
of such ambiguous evidence, the Welch plurality chose to rely on the
Hans Court's view-based largely on the statements by Madison, Mar-
132. See id. at 2291.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 2290.
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (Supp. V 1987).
The term "owner or operator" does not include a unit of State or local gov-
ernment which acquired ownership... involuntarily .... [This] exclusion...
shall not apply to any State ... which has caused ... the release ... of a
hazardous substance ... and such a State... shall be subject to... [this Act]
•.. to the same extent... as any nongovernmental entity ....
Id. Dissecting this section, Justice White found that the liability-creating section ex-
pressly applies only to those exempted owners and operators who subsequently cause a
discharge of a hazardous substance. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273,
2293 (1989). He also asserted that the words "as any nongovernmental entity," which
describe the extent of liability, "[have] meaning as something less than an abrogation
provision because... [they exist] to make the States liable to the Federal Government."
Id.
136. See id. at 2295. Herein lies the difference between Justice White's finessing of
Hans and Justice Brennan's. Justice White apparently believes that Hans only affects
Congress' ability to abrogate under Article III. Justice Brennan's surrender theory as-
serts that Hans only affects Congress' ability to abrogate under self-imposed constitu-
tional prohibitions like the contract clause.
137. See Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818, 2824
(1989) (disposing of case for lack of clear statement of abrogation).
138. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2295 n.8.
139. Id.
140. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 479-88
(1987).
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shall and Hamilton"'-that article III cannot be interpreted to allow an
unconsenting state to be sued in federal court.
It would seem that the principle of state sovereign immunity to which
Justice White subscribes cannot be constitutional. 142 If it were, it could
not be subject to congressional abrogation.143 Furthermore, under its
broad article I legislative powers, Congress can now presumably abrogate
the states' immunity in virtually any area. This would, in turn, substan-
tially eviscerate the supposedly broad effect of Hans in ensuring that pri-
vate plaintiffs would not be able to call unconsenting states into federal
courts.
Justice White, however, carefully avoided overruling Hans. In Hans,
the statute that purported to abrogate state sovereign immunity, the Ju-
diciary Act of 1875 (which conferred general federal question jurisdic-
tion), was enacted under article III, which according to Hans and
subsequent cases, cannot be interpreted to abrogate."4 In Union Gas,
however, the statutes that purport to abrogate were enacted under article
I, which neither the historical evidence nor Hans addresses.1 45
The fact that all statutes that abrogate are subjected to the clear state-
ment test bolsters the conclusion that eleventh amendment immunity is
actually immunity from intrusions based solely on article III. Presuma-
bly, if a distinction between pre- and post-eleventh amendment provi-
sions was at work, those statutes enacted under the latter would require
less of a clear statement.1 46
Justice White is able to exert control over potential wholesale abroga-
tion under article I, or any other power, by extremely strict adherence to
141. See supra note 17.
142. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2286 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (distinguishing between the "legitimate scope of the Eleventh Amendment
limitation on federal judicial power" and the "judicially created doctrine of state immu-
nity even from suits alleging violation of federally protected rights").
143. See Jackson, supra note 3, at 125.
144. See supra note 17.
145. See The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 103, at 215. As a
way of skirting Hans, Justice White's distinction between article I and article III is per-
haps neater than Justice Brennan's distinction between enumerated powers and self-im-
posed prohibitions. See supra note 57. Article III is not self-executing; Congress must
act for its provisions to have effect. Hans held that it may not infringe on state sover-
eignty in doing so. The Court has never limited Congress in this way with respect to its
other powers. But see Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2301 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part) (noting that permitting suits against states under article I "contradicts
our unvarying approach to Article III as setting forth the exclusive catalog of permissible
federal-court jurisdiction") (emphasis in original).
146. See Jackson, supra note 3, at 112 (arguing that clear evidence is an inappropriate
interpretative tool for statutes enacted under section five of the fourteenth amendment;
for other types of legislation, which purport to overcome the federal common-law pre-
sumption of state immunity, a "more complex inquiry based on a range of indicia of
Congress' intent and statutory purpose must be invoked"); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445, 456 (1975) (stressing fourteenth amendment's direct effect on state authority).
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Atascadero's clear statement rule.147 The result reached by Justice White
is facially similar to classic abrogation theory.' 48 This theory argues that
the eleventh amendment corrected the Chisholm Court's interpretation
of article III as abrogating state sovereign immunity of its own force and
that Congress can subject states to federal court suit when it legislates
under its other plenary powers, such as article I.149 Abrogation theory
asserts that article III and the eleventh amendment give states rights
against the federal judiciary but do not affect congressional power.15 0
The subtle difference between abrogation theory and Justice White's
view is that for the former, a clear statement requirement serves the pur-
pose of "ensur[ing] that attempts to limit state power [are] unmistakable,
thereby structuring the legislative process to allow the centrifugal forces
in Congress the greatest opportunity to protect the states' interests."''
By contrast, Justice White, while serving as self-appointed guardian of
congressional intent, always on the lookout for judicial overreaching,
more likely serves to defeat congressional intent by forcing courts to look
myopically at federal statutes in search of precise words.152 Although he
claims that no specific words, such as reference to the eleventh amend-
ment, are necessary, 153 it would seem that a finding of anything less
could preclude a finding of congressional intent to abrogate.' 5 4
C. Justice Scalia's Opinion
Justice Scalia's opinion' 55 is, at first glance, internally inconsistent. He
began by providing the swing vote on the congressional intent issue.' 56
He quickly dismissed Justice White's argument by stating that it is not
correct to interpret CERCLA and SARA separately: "Whether it was
the CERCLA Congress that envisioned [abrogation], or the SARA Con-
gress, is to me irrelevant. The law does." '57 Justice Scalia concluded by
finding that Congress had no authority under the commerce clause to
subject states to liability in federal court for money damages.158 In effect,
he was saying that Congress passed an amendment in technically suffi-
147. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2289-94 (1989); supra notes
131-135 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 19.
149. But see Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2299-300 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part). Justice Scalia contended that article III was never intended as a source of
abrogation authority, as the Court made clear in Hans.
150. See Tribe, supra note 3, at 693.
151. Id. at 695.
152. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2405-06 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2294 n.7 (1989).
154. But see Muth, 109 S. Ct. at 2403 (Scalia, J., concurring).
155. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2295-2303 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
156. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2295.
157. Id. at 2296; cf. Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2403 (1989) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (finding "explicit reference to state sovereign immunity or the Eleventh Amend-
ment" not necessary for effective abrogation).
158. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2299-302 (1989).
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cient language, although a proper interpretation would reveal Congress
had no authority to do so.
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Hoffman v. Connecticut Depart-
ment of Income Maintenance "I compounds the mystery of why he felt
compelled to address the congressional intent issue when the commerce
clause issue was dispositive. In Hoffman, he found that Congress had no
authority to abrogate under the bankruptcy clause, and that this fact pre-
cluded "the necessity of considering whether Congress intended to exer-
cise a power it did not possess." 1
60
In the middle of his Union Gas opinion, Justice Scalia discussed the
overruling of Hans v. Louisiana, an issue he had declined to address in
Welch.16 ' He apparently believes that Hans is the key to the issue of
congressional authority to abrogate under constitutional provisions that
predate the eleventh amendment.
62
Not surprisingly, he found that Hans should not be overruled. 6 ' Mir-
roring sovereign immunity theory, this section of his opinion focused
predominantly on the effect of article III on the pre-ratification doctrine
of sovereign immunity." Article III, he suggested, did not by itself ab-
rogate state sovereign immunity.' 65 The Chisholm Court interpreted ar-
ticle III in this way with a literal interpretation of the state-citizen
diversity clause, however, and was almost immediately overruled by
Congress when it passed the eleventh amendment. This indicates that
the eleventh amendment restored state sovereign immunity to its pre-
Chisholm status.166 Thus, Justice Scalia can conclude that an interpreta-
tion of Hans as embodying a constitutional principle of state sovereign
immunity is entirely reasonable.167
Justice Scalia also dealt with policy considerations by discounting the
need for a federal forum to hear suits by private plaintiffs against
states.1 68 Finally, acknowledging the weakness of the historical evidence
159. 109 S. Ct. 2818, 2824 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
160. Id.
161. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 495-96
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
162. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2296 (1989) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) ("Finding that the statute renders the States liable
in private suits for money damages, I must consider the continuing validity of Hans v.
Louisiana .... ").
163. Id. at 2299.
164. See id. at 2296-97.
165. See id. at 2297.
166. Unfortunately, Justice Scalia has almost none of the eleventh amendment scholar-
ship on his side. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text; sources cited supra note
3.
167. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2297-99 (1989). In addition,
this interpretation allows for recognizing such a principle in many other areas. See, e.g.,
Exparte New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490, 503 (1921) (eleventh amendment applicable to
admiralty suits); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934) (elev-
enth amendment applicable to suits by foreign state against state).
168. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2298. "The inherent necessity of a tribunal for
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for sovereign immunity theory, he relied on stare decisis, or, in his words,
the "mere venerability of an answer consistently adhered to for almost a
century." 169 He stopped just short of saying that stare decisis was the
sole reason for not overruling Hans.
Justice Scalia summarily rejected Justice Brennan's surrender the-
ory.170 He characterized both Justice Brennan's and Justice White's at-
tempts to distinguish Hans as "gossamer" and stated in essence that the
Court should either make peace with the sovereign immunity theory of
Hans or reject it outright. 71
In Part III of his opinion, Justice Scalia set forth his view that the
Court, when faced with a statute enacted under a pre-eleventh amend-
ment constitutional provision, should look for congressional authority to
abrogate sovereign immunity only in article 111.172 He referred to sover-
eign immunity as "a fundamental principle of federalism" and a "struc-
tural component of federalism, and not merely a default disposition that
can be altered by action of Congress pursuant to its Article I powers." 173
Thus, allowance of abrogation under any power other than article III
would be contrary to considerations of federalism.1 74
Justice Scalia distinguished Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer on the basis that the
fourteenth amendment is expressly directed at the states' authority, and
thus, abrogation under section five of that amendment is reasonable.1 75
He set the stage, however, for a limited interpretation of this principle
when he stated that the fourteenth amendment "permits abrogation of
... sovereign immunity only for a limited purpose."176
In Part IV, he advocated overruling the first half of Parden v. Termi-
nal Railway, in which the Court held that Congress, legislating under the
commerce clause, could condition state participation in interstate com-
peaceful resolution of disputes between the Union and the individual States, and between
the individual States themselves, is incomparably greater, in my view, than the need for a
tribunal to resolve disputes on federal questions between individuals and the States." Id.
He offered little support for this statement other than a vague assertion that it follows
from the "scheme of the Constitution." Id.
169. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2298.
170. See id. at 2301. But see Jackson, supra note 3, at 119-26 (arguing that overruling
Hans would clarify the federal common law basis of its progeny).
171. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2299 (1989).
172. "We have never gone thumbing through the Constitution, to see what other origi-
nal grants of authority-as opposed to Amendments adopted after the Eleventh Amend-
ment-might justify elimination of state sovereign immunity." Id. at 2301.
173. Id. at 2299, 2300.
174. Justice Scalia added this dire prediction:
If private suits against States, though not permitted under Article III (by
virtue of the understanding represented by the Eleventh Amendment), are
nonetheless permitted under the Commerce Clause, or under some other Arti-
cle I grant of federal power, then there is no reason why the other limitations of
Article III cannot be similarly exceeded.
Id. at 2301.
175. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2302 (1989).
176. Id. (emphasis added).
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merce on a waiver of immunity from suit in federal court. 177 Justice
Brennan noted that the waiver issue had not been addressed by Union
Gas and, consequently, was not addressed in his opinion. 171 In choosing
to expound on this issue, Justice Scalia rounded out his view of sovereign
immunity. He reasoned that conditional waiver and abrogation under
pre-eleventh amendment provisions make an "end-run" around article
III, and thus are both constitutionally impermissible. 179  -
The first possible explanation of the inconsistency in Justice Scalia's
opinion is that he wished to stake out a wide area of judicial review of
statutes that purport to abrogate state sovereign immunity. By finding
that Congress abrogated state sovereign immunity when it enacted CER-
CLA and SARA and then proceeding to find that Congress had no au-
thority to do so, he presented the legal world with a reductio ad
absurdum of the Court's view.
The second possible explanation is that Justice Scalia cast the fifth vote
on congressional intent in order to express his approval, ironically, for
the use of his favored method of statutory interpretation in a "liberal
bloc" opinion. Justice Scalia advocates a plain meaning approach to stat-
utory interpretation.""° He believes that legislation is a product of com-
promises among different groups, and that trying to divine an intent from
a statute may result in favoring one group."8 He rejects the traditional
assumption that legislators reasonably pursue reasonable goals and thus
disapproves of using legislative history when interpreting a statute.18 2
When statutory language is unclear, he will look to other portions of the
statute or other statutes for similar language as an aid in interpreta-
tion. 1 3 This, of course, is precisely what Justice Brennan did in constru-
ing CERCLA and SARA, albeit for different reasons.18 4
177. See id. at 2302-03.
178. Id. at 2286 n.5.
179. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2303 (1989).
180. See Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 20, 30 (1988).
181. See Note, The Appellate Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 54 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 705, 723-24 (1987).
182. See Aleinikoff, supra note 180, at 30-31; Note, supra note 181, at 723-24. In a
particularly telling passage in Union Gas, he wrote:
It is our task, as I see it, not to enter the minds of the Members of Congress-
who need have nothing in mind in order for their votes to be both lawful and
effective-but rather to give fair and reasonable meaning to the text of the
United States Code, adopted by various Congresses at various times.
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2296 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
183. See Aleinikoff, supra note 180, at 30.
184. Justice Brennan clearly approves of looking at legislative history and trying to
fathom the intent of the legislators in eleventh amendment cases. See Dellmuth v. Muth,
109 S. Ct. 2397, 2403-05 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 248-52 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Coincidentally, con-
strained by the Atascadero standard, he "gets it right" in Justice Scalia's view.
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D. Justice Stevens' Opinion
Justice Stevens concurred in a brief opinion 85 that has a decidedly
different focus from the others. He first distinguished between what he
considered the correct interpretation of the eleventh amendment, which
has been explained by the diversity theorists, 186 and a "common law"
defense of sovereign immunity that the Court created in Hans and subse-
quent cases. 18 7
The defense of sovereign immunity, Justice Stevens argued, is based on
a balancing of state and federal interests and not on the eleventh amend-
ment.188 He cited the conflict between a state's ability to waive its immu-
nity to suit in federal court and the principle that a party may not confer
subject matter jurisdiction on a federal court as proof that the amend-
ment's express limit on judicial power is not at work. 89 He also ex-
plained that the Edelman distinction between permissible prospective
relief and impermissible retrospective relief rested on balancing the vindi-
cation of federal rights and the states' immunity. 9'
Justice Stevens stated that congressional "abrogation" is really Con-
gress' prudential alteration of the federal-state balance.191 On the facts of
Union Gas, he concluded that the federal interest of protecting the envi-
ronment overcame any countervailing state interest.192 Furthermore,
Justice Stevens asserted that the Court should not, in any event, set aside
Congress' decision on the appropriate federal-state balance.193 Justice
Stevens thus picks up where the diversity theorists leave off, providing a
plausible reading of Hans and its progeny.' 94
E. Justice O'Connor's Opinion
Perhaps voicing the most conservative eleventh amendment interpreta-
tion, Justice O'Connor dissented. 195 She found that Congress had no
power to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity under the commerce
clause and joined Justice White's conclusion that there was no unmistak-
185. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2286-89 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
186. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
187. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2286; Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2408
(1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2287.
189. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2287 (1989).
190. See id. at 2287-88. Justice Stevens asserted that "comity and federalism con-
cerns" also explain the anomaly of the Supreme Court's article III appellate review of
state court judgments in actions that would have been barred in federal court by the
eleventh amendment; that is, "a state-court decision defining federal law tips the balance
in favor of federal review." Id. at 2288 & n.3.
191. Id. at 2288-89.
192. See id. at 2289.
193. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2289 (1989).
194. See The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 103, at 216.
195. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2303-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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able evidence of congressional intent to abrogate.1 96
Her view of state sovereign immunity and congressional abrogation
can be characterized as an attempt to "cover all the bases." She con-
curred with Justice Scalia that Congress has no authority to abrogate
under pre-eleventh amendment provisions. 197 As long as a majority of
the Court is using an abrogation analysis (and is unwilling to dispose of
eleventh amendment cases on the power issue alone), however, it is likely
that she will choose to contain the potential damage to state sovereign
immunity by siding with the strictest view on abrogation.
CONCLUSION
The holdings in Union Gas are clear: Congress abrogated state sover-
eign immunity when it enacted CERCLA and SARA, and Congress has
authority to abrogate when legislating under the commerce clause. The
divergent views put forth by the Justices, however, undermine the prece-
dential value of the decision. On the issue of congressional intent to ab-
rogate, Justice Brennan's loose application of the Atascadero standard
probably does not signal a new approach. Justice Scalia likely provided
the swing vote on this issue for a reason other than complete agreement,
namely an opportunity to advance his own theory of statutory interpreta-
tion. Moreover, the decision in Muth, handed down the same day, made
the Atascadero standard even stricter. The holding of congressional au-
thority to abrogate under the commerce clause may be both problematic
and ineffectual: problematic, because Justice White, the fifth vote, still
subscribes to Hans, and ineffectual, because he advocates strict adherence
to Atascadero.
Union Gas has the potential for contributing to eleventh amendment
decisions that adhere more to the politics of a given lower court than to
any coherent rule of law. With reference to the clear statement rule, so-
called liberal courts can use Union Gas as authority for cutting back on
the requirement of clear statement, thereby making it easier to find abro-
gation and proceed to the merits of the case. More conservative courts
will be able safely to ignore this aspect of Union Gas on the strength of
Hoffman and Muth and dispose of suits on the ground of lack of clear
statement. Finally, lower courts will be able either to follow Union Gas'
decision on congressional power to abrogate under the commerce clause
or to cut back on it, at least until Justice White states the reasoning be-
hind his cryptic concurrence.
Letitia A. Sears
196. See Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818, 2824
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
197. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2303-04 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
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